Certain characteristics of the plans of the fleet did not change after Jehanne's death. The various actions of the horde, whether investing an entire planet or striking at an outpost, continued to show the effects of meticulous planning and brilliant staff work. Logistical support for all operations remained virtually flawless, and the timing and arrangements of often complicated maneuvers involving hundreds of vessels showed a degree of foresight and sound training seldom equaled in military history. These observations, coupled with the survival of Thet'r Butler have prompted many to conclude that the true leader of the rebellion was Thet'r, and not Jehanne. A full analysis of the tactical history of the Jihad will not support this argument, however. One of the prominent features of many of the operations of the fleet during the first two decades of the Jihad is best illustrated by the attack on Illerda in 199 B.C. Simply through the use of extraordinarily clever shifts in the disposition of their forces^, the crusaders forced the Illerdans to abandon their moon, and then to surrender their entire planet. The casualties were limited to the crews of two scout vessels that attempted to run the planetary blockade just before the capitulation occurred. The operation1 has remained a textbook example of the distinction between the use of power and the use of force, as these terms are understood in strategic analysis. Examination of the history of the Jihad until the attack on Carthagos shows that this preference for the use of power over the use of force is at the heart of the planning of the Jihad during these years. Rather than crushing opponents by the overwhelming application of the force of the vessels and troops of the Jihad fleet, the threat of such an attack was used to compel me surrender of the enemy. Intelligent use of "power" treats force as a tool best used when it remains implicit.