L. Austin (probably the St. Augustine quoted by Lady Jessica): performatives are those words which, when spoken, constitute an action. For example, when the words "I promise to behave myself' are spoken under the appropriate circumstances, they are in fact a promise; when one says, "I bet you five sovereigns," the words do not describe a bet, they are a bet. Other examples would include marriage vows, bequests, and the like. Hence, in most legal systems for thousands of years, a report of a performative statement has been admissible as evidence, since it is regarded not as a report of what someone said (for it would then be inadmissible as hearsay) but as evidence of an action, of what someone did. Following this hunch, Perobler began to investigate records of the Summa Imperial Court, searching for decisions establishing performatives with legal consequences. As legal historians now know, he found such a decision (Imperium vs. Meljacanz, S.I.C, Sidir XX, 9670). Sidir XX, sixty-third Emperor of House Corrino, had proclaimed a law forbidding false accusations of treason the year before, Meljacanz was a merchant who had spread certain rumors about a competitor, Agnan. To his surprise, Meljacanz found himself not in civil court answering a charge of slander but in criminal court being prosecuted under the newly enacted law. Oo appeal, the Summa Court held that Meljacaoz's words constituted ian accusation in the proces verbal sense. Although Agnan had not been present when the words were spoken, his witnesses had, and then testimony was not hearsay, ruled the court, but an account of what Meljacanz had done. His accusation, Iney ruled, had been performative. Within a century, this ruling had been perverted from a safeguard against slander to a subtle means of oppression. Under an Imperial law of Loag standing, if A charged B with speaking treason, B could refuse to take the witness stand, claiming the ancient protection against seff-inctimiaation. Now that the Summa Court had unwittingly laid the groundwork, A would charge himself with speaking treason (by means of an anony- mous proces verbal; such documents, through some twisted humor in legal tradition, were usually ascribed to "Agnan, whereabouts unknown"). In defending himself against the charge, A would then summon B as a witness to his innocence. If B refused to take the stand, A would petition the court to declare B a reluctant witness. As such, B could not refuse to testify without risking contempt of court, the sentence for which lasted until B purged himself of contempt by taking the stand, and from which there was no appeal. Nor could B, if he took the stand, object to the presence of a truthtrance observer. In one case Perobler uncovered, a victim remained jailed on contempt charges for sixty-eight years, dying in prison on Salusa Secundus. After B had been removed from the picture, 'A could then demand to be confronted by his accuser; since "Agnan" could not be found (since no such person existed), the court would not dismiss the case-such would allow B to be freed-but rather would suspend proceedings until "Agnan" was located, releasing A on his own recognizance, The notorious Imperial informer Elson Ketrer had been so released 201 times when he was assassinated in 10075.